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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This bankruptcy appeal requires us to define the 
boundaries of the term "property of the estate," as used in 
S 541 of Title 11 of the United States Code (Bankruptcy 
Code), in the context of a federal grant relationship. The 
appeal arises out of an adversary action instituted by the 
trustee of debtor Life Service Systems, Inc. (LSS) against 
defendant Westmoreland Human Opportunities, Inc. (WHO), 
charging the latter with a breach of itsfiduciary duty to 
LSS's Unsecured Creditors Committee (Committee). Both 
LSS and WHO are non-profit organizations which provide 
community services to residents of Westmoreland County in 
western Pennsylvania. 
 
In 1995, LSS was selected by the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) to receive grant moneys 
under the federal Supportive Housing Program; LSS and 
HUD executed a Supportive Housing Grant Agreement 
(Grant Agreement) as part of this grantor/grantee 
arrangement. Shortly thereafter, LSS experienced 
significant financial difficulties, ultimatelyfiling a Chapter 
11 bankruptcy petition. Because WHO was one of LSS's 
largest creditors, it accepted an invitation to join the 
Unsecured Creditors Committee. 
 
During its tenure on the Committee, WHO, without 
notifying either its fellow Committee members or the 
Bankruptcy Court, assumed LSS's position as r ecipient of 
Supportive Housing Program funds, executing a Supportive 
Housing Grant Agreement Amendment (Grant Agr eement 
Amendment) with HUD. In the adversary action at issue on 
this appeal, LSS's trustee in bankruptcy alleged that WHO, 
by assuming LSS's interest in the grant r elationship in this 
manner, breached its fiduciary duty to Committee 
constituents. WHO defended on the ground that LSS's 
interest in the Supportive Housing Program grant 
relationship was not property of LSS's bankruptcy estate 
and thus did not trigger a fiduciary duty on WHO's part. 
The Bankruptcy Court rejected WHO's defense, holding that 
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LSS's interest in the grant relationship constituted part of 
LSS's bankruptcy estate and that WHO had ther efore 
violated its fiduciary obligations. It enter ed judgment 
against WHO in the sum of $135,653. On appeal, the 
District Court affirmed. 
 
Against this background, WHO's appeal pr esents the 
question whether a debtor non-profit community service 
organization's interest in a HUD-type federal grant 
relationship constitutes property of the debtor's estate. 
Disagreeing with the Bankruptcy and District Courts, we 
hold that LSS's interest in the grant r elationship with HUD 
is excluded from the definition of "pr operty of the estate" 
set forth in S 541 of the Bankruptcy Code. Despite S 541's 
considerable breadth, HUD's singular supervisory interest 
in ensuring the effective administration of the Supportive 
Housing Program, evidenced by the pervasive, strict, and 
minute oversight over the grant relationship imposed by the 
Program's relevant statutory and r egulatory provisions, 
suffices to exclude LSS's interest in the Supportive Housing 
Program grant relationship from S 541's property definition. 
The District Court, in conducting its S 541 pr operty 
analysis, failed to account for HUD's weighty inter est. The 
court mistakenly viewed the provisions of the Grant 
Agreement as the exclusive calipers for measuring the 
rights yielded to LSS by virtue of the grant r elationship, 
and therefore neglected to consider the substantial 
limitations imposed on those rights by the other statutory 
and regulatory components of the Supportive Housing 
Program scheme. As a result, we conclude that the District 
Court erred in deciding that LSS's inter est in the grant 
relationship constituted property of its bankruptcy estate, 
and we therefore set aside the court's judgment. 
 
However, our conclusion that LSS's inter est does not 
qualify as property for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code 
does not dispose of this appeal. Left unanswer ed is a 
question not considered by either the Bankruptcy or the 
District Court: whether, despite the fact that LSS's interest 
in the grant relationship with HUD was not pr operty of its 
bankruptcy estate, WHO's assumption of LSS's inter est 
without notice to Committee members or to the Bankruptcy 
Court violated the fiduciary duty WHO owed to Committee 
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constituents. The Bankruptcy and District Courts, as well 
as the parties themselves, all appear to have assumed that 
resolution of the bankruptcy property question would also 
dispose of the breach of fiduciary duty issue. Because 
neither the District nor the Bankruptcy Court addr essed 
the issue that our disposition of the case now raises, 
relying instead on the erroneous conclusion that LSS's 
interest qualified as property for purposes of the 
Bankruptcy Code, and because the parties failed to 
adequately brief and argue the question to us, we remand 
the case to the District Court, which may in tur n refer it to 
the Bankruptcy Court, for resolution of the issue. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
A. 
 
In 1995, LSS, a private non-profit community service 
organization operating in western Pennsylvania, undertook 
a project to provide supportive housing assistance to 
homeless families in Westmoreland County. LSS planned to 
purchase and refurbish two small apartment buildings, 
which it would then use to provide those families with 
transitional housing. As the name suggests, transitional 
housing is not intended to furnish homeless families with 
a permanent residence, but rather is designed to supply 
recipients with temporary shelter while they seek 
permanent housing and learn basic life skills necessary for 
independent living.1 LSS's pr oject was to house some 
twenty families with children, and would have provided 
supportive services, including job training and placement, 
day care, adult education, and instruction in daily life skills 
such as nutrition and budgeting. 
 
As its primary source of funding for the pr oject, LSS 
turned to HUD, seeking moneys from HUD's Supportive 
Housing Program. The purpose of this Pr ogram "is to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 11384(b) of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act 
defines "transitional housing" as "housing the purpose of which is to 
facilitate the movement of homeless individuals and families to 
permanent housing within 24 months." 42 U.S.C. S 11384(b). 
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promote the development of supportive housing and 
supportive services, including innovative appr oaches to 
assist homeless persons in the transition fr om 
homelessness, and to promote the provision of supportive 
housing to homeless persons to enable them to live as 
independently as possible." 42 U.S.C. S 11381. The 
Supportive Housing Program facilitates this public purpose 
by furnishing federal moneys to qualified HUD-selected 
applicants, who are to use the funds for several types of 
housing-related activities, including acquisition and/or 
rehabilitation of existing structures, construction of new 
structures, leasing of existing structur es, and provision of 
supportive services for transitional housing r esidents. See 
generally 42 U.S.C. S 11383(a); 24 C.F .R. S 583.100(a) 
(2000). 
 
Recipients of Supportive Housing Program grants are 
selected through a nationwide competitive pr ocess. See 42 
U.S.C. S 11386(b). As part of this process, LSS was required 
to submit to HUD a detailed application and pr oject 
proposal, which furnished information about: (1) the 
housing project itself, such as the project location, the 
number of homeless families that LSS would accommodate 
at that location, and the types of supportive services that 
would be offered at the site; (2) LSS's past experience in 
providing housing assistance, including pr evious housing 
programs it had operated and prior HUD grants it had 
received; and (3) the budget for the pr oposed project. In its 
application, LSS requested $1,326,965 in Supportive 
Housing Program funds to cover the cost of acquiring and 
rehabilitating the two apartment buildings, the operating 
expenses for those premises, the cost of the supportive 
services that would be offered at those sites, and a five 
percent administrative fee for the expenses LSS would incur 
in administering the Supportive Housing Program grant. 
 
On February 5, 1996, LSS received final appr oval from 
HUD for a transitional housing project to be located at 49 
Division Street in Greensburg, W estmoreland County. 
Several days later, LSS and HUD executed the Grant 
Agreement, which obligated HUD to provide $1,326,965 to 
the 49 Division Street project, and committed LSS to 
administer those funds at that project site. The Grant 
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Agreement, which was subject to renewal, carried a three- 
year term and was scheduled to expire in 1999. Shortly 
after the execution of the Grant Agreement, LSS purchased 
the Division Street property and began r enovations. 
 
B. 
 
Several months after entering into the Grant Agr eement 
with HUD, LSS began experiencing significant financial and 
administrative problems. LSS attempted to r esolve these 
difficulties by seeking consulting relationships with other 
non-profit entities. First, in September 1996, LSS entered 
into a consulting agreement with WHO, pursuant to which 
WHO was to furnish management assistance to LSS. 
However, this affiliation ended after a month when WHO 
elected to terminate the agreement upon discovering that 
LSS's financial troubles were mor e serious than originally 
anticipated. Subsequently, on November 9, 1996, LSS 
retained Adelphoi, Inc., another non-pr ofit organization 
operating in Westmoreland County. Pursuant to the 
management agreement entered into with Adelphoi, all of 
LSS's board members resigned and wer e replaced by new 
directors selected by Adelphoi. 
 
Two months after Adelphoi took over LSS's management, 
LSS filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition. At the time of the 
petition, LSS had drawn down approximately $288,800 in 
federal Supportive Housing Program moneys. LSS's interest 
in the grant relationship with HUD was not itself listed on 
the schedule of assets LSS submitted to the Bankruptcy 
Court. An Unsecured Creditors Committee was formed, and 
WHO, which had a claim against LSS for compensation 
based on the brief period it spent providing consulting 
services to LSS, accepted an invitation to sit on the 
Committee. WHO resigned from the Unsecur ed Creditors 
Committee in September 1997 due to accusations of a 
conflict of interest. However, WHO's assumption of LSS's 
Supportive Housing Program grant occurr ed prior to the 
date of this resignation. 
 
Less than two weeks after LSS filed its Chapter 11 
petition, HUD declared LSS in default of the Supportive 
Housing Program grant. By letter dated January 29, 1997, 
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HUD notified LSS that it could no longer r eceive Supportive 
Housing Program disbursements. HUD also infor med LSS 
that its grant would be reactivated should LSS develop a 
"workable plan" acceptable to HUD. Further more, HUD 
warned LSS that if a suitable plan was not forthcoming 
within 30 days, HUD would exercise its power to either 
cancel the remainder of the grant, or select a successor to 
administer the program. Although LSS did not r espond 
within the requested 30-day period, HUD did not in fact 
terminate the grant or replace LSS as grantee; rather, on 
March 4, 1997, HUD sent a follow-up communication to 
LSS, once again requesting a "work-out plan for the 
continued implementation of the [49 Division Str eet 
transitional housing] project." 
 
Ultimately, LSS responded by proposing to HUD that 
Adelphoi acquire ownership of the Division Str eet property 
and that WHO take over administration of the transitional 
housing project located at that site. On May 28, 1997, 
WHO was substituted as recipient of LSS's Supportive 
Housing Program grant, and WHO and HUD executed the 
Grant Agreement Amendment, which identified WHO as the 
project sponsor and as the "Successor to Life Service 
Systems, Inc." The Amendment listed both 49 Division 
Street and a second site at 203 South Maple A venue as the 
relevant project locations for the transitional housing 
project. Apparently, WHO did not fur nish any consideration 
to LSS's estate in exchange for assuming the Grant 
Agreement, and neither WHO nor LSS provided notice of 
the assumption to the Unsecured Creditors Committee or to 
the Bankruptcy Court. 
 
After assuming LSS's Supportive Housing Program grant, 
WHO did not in fact continue the transitional housing 
project at the Division Street location. Shortly after WHO 
and HUD executed the Grant Agreement Amendment, LSS, 
following its proposal that Adelphoi acquir e the transitional 
housing project's real property, petitioned the Bankruptcy 
Court to sell the Division Street property to Westmoreland 
CHODO, a non-profit entity controlled by Adelphoi (and 
apparently unaffiliated with WHO). With approval of the 
Bankruptcy Court, the Division Street r eal estate was put 
up for auction. However, Westmor eland CHODO was outbid 
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by a third party purchaser, and thus did not acquire the 
Division Street real estate. WHO, appar ently uninterested 
in dealing with the third party buyer, discontinued the 
transitional housing project at the Division Street site and 
elected to carry on the program at a dif ferent location. 
 
C. 
 
Following the property sale, the Bankruptcy Court 
appointed James Walsh as LSS's Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 
Trustee, at the request of the Unsecur ed Creditors 
Committee. On February 16, 1998, the Trustee instituted 
an adversary action against WHO in the Bankruptcy Court, 
alleging that WHO, as a member of the Unsecur ed Creditors 
Committee, owed a fiduciary duty to the other members of 
the Committee which it breached by taking over LSS's 
status as a recipient of federal Supportive Housing Program 
moneys without furnishing notice to other unsecured 
creditors or obtaining prior court appr oval.2 In its defense, 
WHO argued that it breached no fiduciary duty because 
LSS's interest in the Supportive Housing Pr ogram grant 
relationship with HUD was never property of LSS's 
bankruptcy estate within the meaning of S 541 of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
 
The Bankruptcy Court held in the Trustee's favor, 
concluding that LSS's interest in the grant r elationship with 
HUD constituted property of LSS's bankruptcy estate. 
Furthermore, the court determined that WHO did in fact 
breach its fiduciary duty to fellow Committee members, and 
awarded LSS's estate $135,653 in monetary r elief.3 WHO 
 
(Text continued on page 11) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. LSS's Bankruptcy Trustee also instituted adversary actions against 
Adelphoi and LSS's board of directors (elected by Adelphoi), claiming, 
inter alia, a breach of fiduciary duty in connection with WHO's 
succession to the Supportive Housing Program grant. These actions were 
settled before trial. 
 
3. As the remedy for WHO's alleged br each of fiduciary duty, LSS's 
Trustee did not seek to have the Bankruptcy Court void and set aside 
WHO's assumption of the Supportive Housing Pr ogram grant; rather, the 
Trustee only requested monetary damages. The record does not make 
the basis for this monetary relief entir ely clear. The following is our 
rendering. 
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The damage request consisted of three components. First, the Trustee 
sought compensation for claims brought by five individuals relocated by 
LSS as part of its acquisition and rehabilitation of the Division Street 
property. The Supportive Housing Program r equires a grant recipient to 
provide compensation to individuals displaced as a direct result of the 
recipient's supportive housing project. See 24 C.F.R. S 583.310 (2000). 
Although the record is silent on this issue, we can infer from the fact 
that these five individuals were listed among LSS's general unsecured 
creditors that LSS had failed to provide the full measure of assistance 
required by the Supportive Housing Pr ogram. 
 
Second, LSS's Trustee sought recovery for amounts owed to matching 
fund grantors Westmoreland County Housing Authority, United Way, and 
Richard K. Mellon Foundation, also listed among LSS's general 
unsecured creditors. Before a grantee can receive federal funds under 
the Supportive Housing Program for the acquisition or rehabilitation of 
existing structures, or for new construction, it must obtain matching 
funds from non-HUD sources equal to the amount of federal funds it is 
requesting for those activities. See 42 U.S.C. S 11386(e); 24 C.F.R. 
S 583.145 (2000). To satisfy this obligation, LSS contributed its own 
moneys, and secured matching funds from the Westmoreland County 
Housing Authority, the United Way, and the Mellon Foundation. 
Although the record on appeal does not contain the terms of the 
agreements entered into by LSS and the matching fund grantors, the 
grantors apparently conditioned their pr ovision of matching funds on the 
continued use of those funds for a transitional housing project at the 49 
Division Street location. According to the Bankruptcy Court, when WHO, 
after succeeding to LSS's interest in the Supportive Housing Program 
grant relationship with HUD, decided not to continue the project at the 
49 Division Street site, the matching fund grantors acquired a claim 
against LSS's estate for a return of the balance of their donated moneys. 
 
Finally, LSS's Trustee requested monetary relief in the amount of the 
Supportive Housing grant moneys allocated to the grantee's 
administrative expenses. According to the Bankruptcy Court, WHO 
benefitted by receiving this amount as part of its succession to LSS's 
Supportive Housing Program grant because WHO was able to use those 
moneys to pay part of its employee salaries without having to 
demonstrate that those employees worked exclusively on the 
administration of the transitional housing pr ogram. 
 
The Bankruptcy Court's $135,653 award cover ed only the latter two 
components of the Trustee's monetary r elief claim. Because WHO 
stipulated at trial that it had assumed LSS's obligation to provide 
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appealed to the District Court for the Wester n District of 
Pennsylvania, contending that the Bankruptcy Court had 
erroneously concluded that LSS's interest in the Supportive 
Housing Program grant relationship with HUD qualified as 
property of LSS's bankruptcy estate. The District Court, 
however, affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's judgment, and 
WHO timely appealed to this court.4 In addition to the 
briefs of the parties, we requested (and r eceived) an amicus 
curiae brief from the Bankruptcy Section and the 
Commercial Litigation Department of the Civil Division of 
the Department of Justice stating their position on the 
central issues. We also gave the parties an opportunity to 
reply to this amicus brief. 
 
II. Property of the Estate 
 
The filing of a voluntary petition in bankruptcy court 
commences a bankruptcy case and creates a bankruptcy 
estate comprised of the debtor's property as of the 
commencement of the case. See 11 U.S.C.SS 301, 541. 
Section 541(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code defines"property 
of the estate" as including "all legal or equitable interests of 
the debtor in property as of the commencement of the 
case." Id. S 541(a)(1). As the Supr eme Court observed in 
United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983), 
S 541(a)'s legislative history demonstrates that the language 
of this provision was intended to sweep br oadly to include 
"all kinds of property, including tangible or intangible 
property, causes of action . . . and all other forms of 
property currently specified in section 70a of the 
Bankruptcy Act." Id. at 205 n.9 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95- 
595, at 367 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963); 
see also In re O'Dowd, 233 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
In view of this definition, we must determine whether 
LSS's interest in the grant relationship constituted a "legal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
relocation assistance to the five displaced individuals (the first 
component), the Bankruptcy Court held that LSS's bankruptcy estate 
could not recover that amount. 
 
4. The Bankruptcy Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 157, the District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 158(a)(1), 
and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 158(d). 
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or equitable interest[ ]" that, under the terms of S 541(a)(1), 
falls within S 541's property definition. Because a district 
court's conclusion as to whether an item constitutes 
"property of the estate" for purposes ofS 541 raises a 
question of law, our review is plenary. See In re Blatstein, 
192 F.3d 88, 94 (3d Cir. 1999). W e first identify the specific 
interests regarded by the District Court as constituting 
property of LSS's bankruptcy estate. We next examine the 
ways in which a federal agency's supervisory inter est in a 
grant relationship can alter the dynamics ofS 541's 
property calculus. We then focus on the District Court's 
principal error in this case, i.e., its failur e entirely to 
account for HUD's weighty federal interest in the 
Supportive Housing Program, and conclude that, had the 
court given proper weight to HUD's strong interest, LSS's 
interest in the grant relationship would have been excluded 
from LSS's estate for bankruptcy purposes. Finally, we note 
that considerations of bankruptcy policy militate in favor of 
excluding LSS's interest from S 541's property definition. In 
the course of this discussion, we distinguish LSS's 
Trustee's attempts to rely on case law holding that 
government-issued licenses, in general, qualify as property 
of the estate under the Bankruptcy Code. Our last task will 
then be to delineate the scope of our holding in the instant 
case. 
 
A. 
 
Analysis under S 541's property definition must begin by 
focusing directly on the specific inter ests claimed to 
constitute the debtor's property. In the case before us, the 
District Court characterized LSS's interest in the grant 
relationship as a set of contractual rights arising out of the 
Grant Agreement executed between LSS and HUD in 1995, 
ultimately deciding that these contractual rights were 
property of LSS's bankruptcy estate. In r eaching this 
conclusion, the District Court began by turning to relevant 
Pennsylvania state law and determining that, under that 
case law, contractual rights are classified as property 
interests. See, e.g., Klingner v. Pocono Int'l Raceway, Inc., 
433 A.2d 1357, 1361 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (noting that 
contractual rights are personal property under 
Pennsylvania law). 
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In terms of our analysis, we do not question the District 
Court's reading of Pennsylvania law, and assume that 
ordinary contract rights would qualify as such property 
interests under that state law; it is well-established that 
federal courts typically must look to state law in 
ascertaining the existence and scope of the debtor's"legal 
or equitable interests" for purposes ofS 541(a)(1). See 
Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979) ("Congress 
has generally left the determination of pr operty rights in the 
assets of a bankrupt's estate to state law.") (footnote 
omitted); O'Dowd, 233 F.3d at 202 ("While federal law 
defines what types of property comprise the estate, state 
law generally determines what interest, if any, a debtor has 
in property."). It is also settled that the expansive nature of 
S 541's property definition encompasses rights and interests 
arising from ordinary contractual r elationships. See 5 
Collier on Bankruptcy P 541.08[4], at 541-49 (15th ed. rev., 
King et al. eds., 1996); see also In re Minoco Group of Cos., 
Ltd., 799 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that 
insurance contracts constitute "property of the estate" for 
purposes of S 541). 
 
Attempting to delineate the scope of LSS's inter est in the 
grant relationship, the District Court examined the 
provisions of the Grant Agreement executed in 1995 
between LSS and HUD, and identified three sets of 
contractual rights that it believed arose out of the 
relationship: (1) the debtor LSS's right to r eceive payment 
from HUD for authorized expenditures that LSS incurred 
while administering its Supportive Housing Pr ogram 
project; (2) the debtor's right to compel HUD to make 
payments in connection with LSS's administration of the 
Supportive Housing Program; and (3) the debtor's right to 
assign its interest in the Supportive Housing Grant, subject 
to HUD's prior written approval. The court then held that 
LSS's interest in the grant relationship, evidenced by these 
three sets of rights, qualified as pr operty of LSS's 
bankruptcy estate within the meaning of S 541. We 
conclude that this decision was incorrect. 
 
B. 
 
At bottom, the problem with the District Court's S 541 
property analysis lies in its failure to take into account 
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HUD's strong federal interest in supervising the efficient 
and effective administration of Supportive Housing Program 
grant funds by intermediaries such as LSS, designed to 
ensure that the Program's ultimate beneficiaries (i.e., 
homeless individuals) receive the full measur e of federal 
assistance afforded to them under the ter ms of the 
Program. As will be seen in detail below, HUD's singular 
interest in preserving such a supervisory role--evidenced by 
the strict and pervasive oversight imposed by the 
Supportive Housing Program scheme on the grant 
relationship--can alter the dynamics of S 541's property 
calculus, resulting in the exclusion of the grantee's interest 
from its bankruptcy estate. 
 
Our analysis proceeds in several steps. W e first explain 
that a federal agency's supervisory interest over the 
administration of a grant program can r esult in the 
exclusion of a grantee's interest in the grant relationship 
from S 541's property definition if the interest is sufficiently 
weighty. We then present a method for assessing when an 
agency's interest rises to such a level. Finally, we focus on 
the facts of the case before us and on the specific 
provisions of the Supportive Housing Pr ogram, explaining 
the two related ways in which the District Court's failure to 
account for HUD's supervisory interest manifested itself: (1) 
the court neglected to consider the pervasive r estrictions 
imposed on a Program grantee's rights by the substantive 
provisions of two major components of the Supportive 
Housing Program grant scheme; and (2) in light of these 
limitations, the court construed the scope of the LSS's 
rights under the grant arrangement too expansively. 
 
1. 
 
A federal agency like HUD clearly has a substantial 
supervisory interest in preserving the coherence and 
integrity of the federal grant scheme it is char ged with 
administering, and in ensuring that federal grant moneys 
disbursed pursuant to that scheme are dispensed by 
intermediaries in an efficient and ef fective manner to the 
ultimate beneficiaries of the grant. While the Bankruptcy 
Code's property definition is certainly expansive, it is not 
limitless, and, as we will demonstrate, a federal agency's 
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strong supervisory interest in the administration of a grant 
program can play a significant role in determining whether 
the interests created by a federal grant program fall within 
S 541's definition of "property of the estate." 
 
We recognize, of course, that each time a federal agency 
executes a contractual agreement with a private party, or 
enters into an arrangement with an entity in or der to 
furnish assistance to the public, a federal interest is 
arguably implicated. We therefor e must take care to 
distinguish those situations in which a federal grantor 
agency's supervisory interest is sufficiently weighty to 
exclude the grantee's interest in the grant r elationship from 
S 541's property definition from those situations in which it 
is not. As we see it, the strength of an agency's supervisory 
interest can best be gauged by examining the substantive 
provisions of the grant scheme established by applicable 
federal statutes and regulations. Cf. In r e Joliet-Will County 
Cmty. Action Agency, 847 F.2d 430, 431-32 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(analyzing the provisions of a federal "foster grandparents" 
grant program administered by ACTION as part of the S 541 
bankruptcy property inquiry). 
 
To be sure, if a provision of a federal grant program 
specifically authorizes federal grant moneys to be used to 
pay a debtor grantee's creditors, it will be difficult for us to 
conclude that the federal agency's interest is sufficiently 
weighty to exclude the debtor's interest fr om S 541's 
property definition. Cf. id. at 432. But the Supportive 
Housing Program involved in the case befor e us contains no 
such authorization, and thus our analysis of the nature of 
HUD's supervisory interest, as manifested in the 
substantive provisions of the Program, must be more 
searching. 
 
The strength of an agency's supervisory inter est can best 
be measured by the level of agency oversight over the grant 
relationship preserved in the provisions of the federal grant 
program. A grant framework clearly evidences a desire to 
sustain the federal agency's strong supervisory interest over 
that relationship when it: (1) gives an agency extensive 
control over the identity of the grant r ecipients with whom 
it must deal by limiting the pool of applicants eligible to 
receive funds, and by restricting the grantee's ability to 
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substitute a replacement entity in its stead; and (2) imposes 
rigorous federal oversight of the grantee's per formance in 
furtherance of the grant relationship. 
 
As we see it, a federal agency's retention of pervasive 
restrictions on a grantee's identity and manner of 
performance under a HUD-type grant pr ogram is 
inconsistent with the grantee's assertion of a pr operty 
interest in the grant relationship. As we will discuss below 
after examining the details of the Supportive Housing 
Program, such limitations greatly constrict the scope of the 
rights yielded to the grantee by the terms of the grant 
arrangement, and substantially (if not completely) r estrict 
their transferability and alienability, ther eby effectively 
rendering the grantee's interest essentially valueless. 
Moreover, as we explain infra in Part II.C., inclusion of such 
interests in the grantee's bankruptcy estate would further 
neither the equitable nor the rehabilitative purpose of the 
Bankruptcy Code. As a result, we are satisfied that if these 
controls are sufficiently extensive, i.e., if, under the terms 
of the arrangement between the grantor federal agency and 
the grantee, the agency retains strict, pervasive, and 
minute oversight over the identity of the grant r ecipient and 
the manner of that recipient's perfor mance, the existence of 
such controls can demonstrate that the federal grantor 
agency's interest in ensuring the effective administration of 
that program is weighty enough to exclude the grantee's 
interest from S 541's property definition.5 
 
A number of federal courts have applied a similar 
approach to resolve the related question whether 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Our analysis of the supervisory controls and limitations over the grant 
arrangement reserved to HUD is not meant to speak to the relationship 
between federal grantees and grantor agencies in other contexts, such as 
the government's liability for the acts of its grantees for purposes of 
the 
Federal Tort Claims Act. In that context, the Supreme Court has 
distinguished between the pervasive conditions imposed by a grantor 
agency to further federal supervision of the grant's administration, and 
the control over day-to-day operations r etained by the grant recipient. 
Because of this distinction, the Court has held that federal "regulations 
do not convert the acts of entrepreneurs .. . into federal government 
acts." United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 816 (1976) (footnote 
omitted). 
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unexpended federal funds themselves and property 
purchased with those moneys once disbursed (as opposed 
to contract rights like those at issue on this appeal) 
constitute bankruptcy property of the debtor within the 
meaning of S 541. For instance, the Seventh Circuit in 
Joliet-Will considered the bankruptcy property status of 
such funds and property in the case of a bankrupt 
nonprofit community service organization. Although the 
debtor's trustee claimed that those items repr esented 
property of the debtor's estate, the Seventh Circuit 
concluded that the federal moneys and personal pr operty 
fell outside of S 541's property definition because the nature 
of the federal grant program and the relationship between 
the grantee community organization and grantor federal 
agency rendered the debtor organization "a trustee, 
custodian, or other intermediary, who lacks beneficial title 
and is merely an agent for the disbursal of funds belonging 
to another." Id. at 432 (citing to 11 U.S.C. S 541(d)). 
 
In reaching this conclusion, the court r elied principally 
on the fact that "[t]he grants impose minute controls on the 
use of the funds, such that the recipient has very little 
discretion." Id. (emphasis added). More specifically, the 
court noted that each grant required the r ecipient to adhere 
to a budget identifying particular project items and the 
costs chargeable to the grant for each item; that the grantee 
could not re-allocate unused moneys between items; that 
the grantee was required to reconvey title to property 
purchased with grant funds and costing mor e than $1,000 
to the federal government, at the federal agency's direction; 
and that the statutes and regulations cr eating the grant 
scheme did not authorize the grantor federal agency to 
permit grant moneys to be used to pay cr editors of the 
private grantee. See id. 
 
Federal district and bankruptcy courts have also used 
the pervasiveness of government control over the 
administration of a grant program as the touchstone for 
assessing whether federal grant moneys and the pr operty 
purchased with those moneys constitute pr operty of the 
grantee's bankruptcy estate. See, e.g., In r e Community 
Assocs., Inc., 173 B.R. 824, 828 (D. Conn. 1994) (holding 
that three vans purchased with grant funds by the debtor, 
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a private community service organization, did not constitute 
property of the debtor's estate for bankruptcy purposes, on 
the ground that the agreement between the grantee 
organization and grantor agency imposed " `minute controls' 
on . . . [the] use of the grant funds and the use of the vans" 
purchased with those grant funds); In r e Alpha Ctr., Inc., 
165 B.R. 881, 884 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1994) (holding that a 
van and state grant moneys transferred by the debtor 
community service organization to a successor grantee were 
not property of the debtor's estate for bankruptcy purposes, 
on the ground that extensive legislation and r egulatory 
rules restricted the debtor community service organization's 
discretion as to the use of grant moneys and vans 
purchased with those grant moneys); cf. In re Southwest 
Citizens' Org. for Poverty Elimination, 91 B.R. 278, 286-87 
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1988) (noting that, although the federal 
grantor agency conceded that twenty vehicles pur chased by 
the debtor community service organization with federal 
grant funds constituted property of the debtor's estate, the 
federal agency, by virtue of the restrictions imposed by the 
agency on the grantee's use of the funds, retained an 
"equitable reversionary interest" in the vehicles superior to 
the debtor's interest and the debtor's trustee's interest as a 
hypothetical lien creditor under 11 U.S.C.S 544). We believe 
that such a "minute control" analysis is equally appropriate 
in assessing whether a debtor's interest in a grant 
relationship with HUD qualifies as pr operty of the debtor's 
estate under the terms of the Bankruptcy Code. 
 
We hold then that a federal agency's inter est in ensuring 
the efficient administration of program funds can result in 
the exclusion of the debtor grantee's interest in the grant 
relationship from S 541's pr operty definition if the agency's 
supervisory controls over the identity of the grantee and the 
manner of the grantee's performance ar e sufficiently 
pervasive and rigorous. The District Court, however, 
neglected entirely to take account of HUD's str ong interest 
in the Supportive Housing Program. This omission 
manifested itself in two related ways. First, the court 
mistakenly viewed the provisions of the Grant Agreement 
itself as the exclusive calipers for measuring the rights and 
obligations that LSS and HUD incurred by virtue of their 
grantor/grantee relationship, failing to consider the 
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restrictions placed on those rights by the other major 
components of the Supportive Housing Program, both 
statutory and regulatory. Second, the court construed the 
scope of the contractual rights it identified as arising out of 
the Grant Agreement too expansively, omitting 
consideration of the limitations imposed on those rights by 
the full Supportive Housing Program scheme. W e now turn 
to the facts of the case sub judice and to the details of the 
Supportive Housing Program, and explain why the District 
Court's conclusion that LSS's interest in the Program 
qualified as bankruptcy property was err oneous. 
 
2. 
 
The District Court conducted its "property of the estate" 
inquiry by focusing solely on the Grant Agreement executed 
between LSS and HUD in 1995, concluding that "LSS' 
rights under the Grant Agreement became property of the 
bankruptcy estate once the bankruptcy petition wasfiled." 
By confining its examination to the Grant Agr eement, 
however, the court failed to take into account the fact that 
the Grant Agreement represents only one component of a 
broader federal grant scheme. To be sur e, the grant 
agreement into which the government and a grantee enter 
is an important element of the Supportive Housing 
Program's framework for the disbursement and 
administration of federal housing assistance funds. See 24 
C.F.R. S 583.400(a) (2000) ("The duty to provide supportive 
housing or supportive services in accordance with the 
requirements of this part will be incorporated in a grant 
agreement executed by HUD and the recipient."). However, 
the grant agreement is by no means the exclusive source of 
those parties' rights and obligations under the federal 
Supportive Housing Program. The rights and obligations of 
grantor and grantee are also detailed in: (1) Subtitle C of 
the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act 
(Homeless Assistance Act or Act), 42 U.S.C. SS 11381-89; 
and (2) a set of regulations codified at 24 C.F.R. S 583 
(Supportive Housing Rule or Rule), see 42 U.S.C. S 11387 
(authorizing the HUD Secretary to issue final regulations 
implementing the Homeless Assistance Act). In fact, the 
Grant Agreement itself recognizes that the provisions of the 
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Homeless Assistance Act and the Supportive Housing Rule 
are integral elements of the grant relationship. For example, 
the Grant Agreement states that "[t]his grant agreement will 
be governed by the [Homeless Assistance] Act, [and] the 
Supportive Housing rule (24 CFR 583), a copy of which is 
attached hereto . . . and made a part her eof." 
 
Considering all of the components of the Supportive 
Housing Program as a coherent whole, it is evident that 
HUD's strong federal interest in safeguar ding the effective 
administration of Program funds, demonstrated by the 
rigorous controls imposed on the grant r elationship by the 
Act and the Rule, suffices to exclude LSS's inter est in the 
grant relationship from LSS's bankruptcy estate. The 
Supportive Housing Program scheme--embodied in the 
Homeless Assistance Act, Supportive Housing Rule, and the 
grant agreement executed between HUD and the grantee-- 
places important limitations on and provides HUD with 
extensive oversight over both the identity of grant recipients 
and the manner of those recipients' per formances under 
the grant arrangement. Turning first to the restrictions 
imposed on the identity of grantees, the provisions of the 
Program limit eligibility for receipt of federal funding to 
certain statutorily-enumerated entities: only "a State, 
metropolitan city, urban county, governmental entity, 
private nonprofit organization, or community mental health 
association that is a public nonprofit or ganization" is 
eligible to serve as a grant recipient. See  42 U.S.C. 
S 11382(1).d 
 
Further, in order to secure the right to administer 
Program funds, even those entities within this limited pool 
of eligible applicants must participate in a nationwide 
competitive process, in which they are r equired to submit a 
comprehensive project proposal. Recipients are selected by 
HUD, and the Homeless Assistance Act expressly mandates 
that HUD use the seven statutorily-enumerated criteria 
listed in the margin in order to make its selection. See 42 
U.S.C. S 11386(b).6 On their face, these seven criteria 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Section 11386(b), titled "Selection criteria," states in full: 
 
        The Secretary [of Housing and Urban Development] shall select 
       applicants approved by the Secretary as tofinancial responsibility 
to 
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demonstrate that HUD is to use these factors as a screen 
for ensuring that the grant recipient will implement its 
proposed project and administer Supportive Housing 
Program funds in an efficient and effective manner. 
 
In addition, and most importantly, the Supportive 
Housing Program preserves HUD's contr ol over the identity 
of the grant recipient by prohibiting changes in the grantee 
absent HUD's prior written approval. The Supportive 
Housing Rule states that "[a] recipient may not make any 
significant changes to an approved pr ogram without prior 
HUD approval," and expressly defines"significant changes" 
to include "a change in the recipient." 24 C.F.R. 
S 583.405(a)(1) (2000). This general r estraint on a grantee's 
ability to alienate or assign its interest in the grant 
arrangement with HUD is also reflected in a provision of the 
Grant Agreement executed between LSS and HUD:"No 
change may be made to the project nor any right, benefit, 
or advantage of the Recipient hereunder be assigned 
without prior written approval of HUD." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       receive assistance under this part by a national competition based 
       on criteria established by the Secretary, which shall include-- 
 
        (1) the ability of the applicant to develop an d operate a 
project; 
 
        (2) the innovative quality of the proposa l in providing a 
project; 
 
        (3) the need for the type of project pr oposed by the applicant in 
       the area to be served; 
 
        (4) the extent to which the amount of assistan ce to be provided 
       under this part will be supplemented with resources from other 
       public and private sources; 
 
        (5) the cost-effectiveness of the pr oposed project; 
 
        (6) the extent to which the applicant has demo nstrated 
       coordination with other Federal, State, local, private and other 
       entities serving homeless persons in the planning and operation of 
       the project, to the extent practicable; and 
 
        (7) such other factors as the Secretary d etermines to be 
       appropriate to carry out this part in an ef fective and efficient 
       manner. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 11386(b). 
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The Supportive Housing Program's limitations on the 
uses to which grantees can put federal funds ar e just as 
strict, if not more so, than the Program's controls over the 
identity of grant recipients. In general, a Supportive 
Housing Program grant is tied to a particular project 
location, detailed in the recipient's funding proposal and 
application. A recipient may not change the location of the 
project site without prior written HUD appr oval. See 24 
C.F.R. S 583.405(a)(1) (2000). Further more, the Supportive 
Housing Rule requires each recipient's project to comply 
with all applicable state and local housing codes, see id. 
S 583.300(a), and to meet various habitability standards 
with respect to such matters as structur e and materials, 
interior air quality, and water supply, see id.  S 583.300(b). 
Most importantly, if the grant recipient r eceives Supportive 
Housing Program moneys for acquisition, r ehabilitation, or 
new construction purposes, the Supportive Housing 
Program requires that the recipient continue to use the 
property at that project site for the particular purposes 
specified in the funding application for at least 20 years. 
See 42 U.S.C. S 11383(b)(1); 24 C.F .R. S 583.305(a) (2000). 
 
Finally, the Supportive Housing Program fur nishes HUD 
with a series of remedial options exercisable in the event of 
a default on the part of the grant recipient. For example, 
should the grantee cease to use the project site for the 
agreed-upon project purposes befor e the expiration of the 
20-year period, the Supportive Housing Program mandates 
that the recipient be required to r epay to HUD some or all 
of the federal grant moneys it has received. If the property 
ceases to be used for listed project purposes within 10 
years of the project's start date, the Pr ogram requires that 
the recipient repay to HUD 100 per cent of the acquisition, 
rehabilitation, or new construction assistance received. And 
if the property ceases being used in the r equired manner 
some time after 10 years have passed, the repayment 
obligation is reduced by 10 percentage points for each year 
in excess of the 10 years that the property was used as 
supportive housing. See 42 U.S.C. S 11383(c)(1); 24 C.F.R. 
S 583.305(b) (2000). In addition, the Grant Agreement 
executed between LSS and HUD lists other remedial 
options available to HUD upon due notice to the grantee, 
including the issuance of a letter of warning requesting 
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corrective action, the reduction of grant amounts, and the 
substitution of an alternate recipient of HUD's choosing. 
 
In the aggregate, these provisions demonstrate that the 
Supportive Housing Program contemplates a str ong 
supervisory role for HUD, the agency char ged with 
implementing the Program and ensuring its efficient and 
effective administration. As we see it, HUD's interest was 
strong enough to materially affect theS 541 "property of the 
estate" calculus, excluding LSS's interest in the grant 
relationship with HUD from LSS's bankruptcy estate. In 
contrast, in its opinion, the District Court never mentioned 
either the Homeless Assistance Act or the Supportive 
Housing Rule, instead focusing exclusively on the Grant 
Agreement. The court's failure to account for HUD's strong 
supervisory interest in the administration of the Supportive 
Housing Program led to its incorrect conclusion that LSS's 
interest qualified as property of its bankruptcy estate. 
 
Furthermore, by omitting consideration of HUD's strong 
supervisory interest in the grant relationship, the District 
Court also appeared to give too much weight to LSS's 
contractual rights, because it failed to consider the 
limitations imposed on those rights by the substantive 
provisions of the Supportive Housing Pr ogram scheme. For 
example, in identifying the contractual rights yielded to LSS 
by virtue of its grant relationship with HUD, the District 
Court pointed to the fact that LSS had the power to assign 
its interest in the Supportive Housing Grant arrangement 
to another party. Although it recognized that this power of 
assignment was subject to HUD's prior written appr oval, 
the District Court did not take sufficient note of the extent 
of the restrictions that the other components of the 
Supportive Housing Program, i.e., the Homeless Assistance 
Act and the Supportive Housing Rule, placed on the 
grantee's power to assign. 
 
For instance, as discussed above, S 11382(1) of the 
Homeless Assistance Act restricts eligibility for Supportive 
Housing Program funding to a prescribed list of entities-- 
essentially state and local government units and non-profit 
organizations--and S 11386(b) of the Act directs that 
grantees be selected by HUD according to expr ess 
statutorily-enumerated criteria. Under the ter ms of the 
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Supportive Housing Program, LSS would not have had the 
power to assign its interest to a party that fell outside of 
S 11382(1)'s list of eligible entities--e.g., a private for-profit 
corporation--or to a party that failed to meet the criteria set 
forth in S 11386(b). The District Court's analysis, however, 
implied that LSS's right to assign was limited solely by the 
necessity of HUD's formal approval, and not by the 
substantial restrictions on the grant r elationship imposed 
by the other components of the Supportive Housing 
Program. In short, by omitting consideration of HUD's 
strong supervisory interest, the court construed the scope 
of the grantee's power of assignment too broadly.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Although not necessary to our conclusion that LSS's interest in the 
grant relationship fails to constitute part of the property of its 
bankruptcy estate, we note another way in which the District Court's 
assessment of the scope of LSS's interest was too expansive. As noted at 
the outset of Section II, the District Court, in concluding that LSS had 
a cognizable property interest for bankruptcy purposes, also pointed to 
two other contractual rights that it believed LSS possessed as a 
consequence of its grant relationship with HUD: (1) LSS's right to receive 
payment from HUD for authorized expenditur es incurred while 
administering its Supportive Housing Program pr oject; and (2) LSS's 
right to compel HUD to make payments in connection with LSS's 
administration of the Supportive Housing Program. In essence, these 
rights represent two sides of the same coin: both are concerned with 
LSS's ability to require HUD to pay moneys for expenses that LSS 
incurred in implementing and running its Supportive Housing Program 
project, and hence our discussion treats these two rights together. 
 
The Department of Justice (DOJ), as amicus curiae, argues that, just 
as the District Court construed LSS's power of assignment too robustly, 
so too it treated these contractual rights to compel payment as having 
too broad a scope. Specifically, DOJ contends that LSS did not have a 
general right to receive moneys for HUD. Rather , DOJ asserts, LSS's 
right to receive payment from HUD was cir cumscribed by the provisions 
of the Tucker Act, which authorizes actions seeking money damages 
against the federal government for breach of contract. See 28 U.S.C. 
S 1346(a)(2) ("Little Tucker Act" granting concurrent jurisdiction to the 
district courts and the United States Court of Federal Claims over 
claims, not in excess of $10,000, founded "upon any express or implied 
contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated 
damages in cases not sounding in tort"); id.  S 1491(a)(1) ("Big Tucker 
Act" 
granting exclusive jurisdiction to the United States Court of Federal 
Claims over identical claims in excess of $10,000); Dia Navigation Co. v. 
Pomeroy, 34 F.3d 1255, 1267 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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C. 
 
Considerations of bankruptcy policy also militate in favor 
of the conclusion detailed in the previous section. Cf. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
According to DOJ, a claim against the federal government under the 
Tucker Act will lie only if the government, in administering the grant 
program, incurs a contractual obligation to the grantee, breaches that 
obligation (thereby injuring the grantee), and the grantee then uses the 
Tucker Act as a vehicle for obtaining "monetary compensation for [this] 
past injury." Cole County Reg'l Sewer Dist. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 
551, 556 (1991), aff 'd without opinion, 949 F.2d 402, 404 (Fed. Cir. 
1991); see also City of Wheeling v. United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 659, 664 
(1990) (holding that the Claims Court, the pr edecessor to the Court of 
Federal Claims, has jurisdiction under the Tucker Act to hear a city's 
challenge to the Environmental Protection Agency's refusal to disburse 
grant funds to cover the increased engineering fee the city was obligated 
to pay as a result of its renegotiation of an engineering contract, on the 
ground that the city's claim "seeks a r emedy which is retroactive in 
nature (monetary compensation for an injury to property)"). 
 
With respect to the Supportive Housing Program, DOJ contends that 
a contractual obligation on the part of HUD would have been triggered 
only if LSS had expended its own moneys for authorized Program 
expenses, and then HUD had refused to r eimburse LSS out of the grant 
funds allocated to LSS's supportive housing pr oject. Thus, according to 
DOJ, LSS did not have the broad, generalized right to compel HUD to 
disburse Program moneys that the District Court appeared to assume 
that LSS possessed; rather, the argument continues, LSS had the much 
narrower right to receive grant funds fr om HUD to cover expenses 
incurred in furtherance of authorized grant purposes. 
 
DOJ's analysis of LSS's ability to compel payment of Program moneys 
glosses over significant unresolved issues, e.g., whether federal 
assistance agreements, such as the Grant Agr eement at issue on this 
appeal, constitute "express or implied contract[s]" within the meaning of 
the Tucker Act. The jurisprudence on this issue is inconclusive. Compare 
Trauma Serv. Group, Ltd. v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 426, 429-30 
(1995) (holding that a cooperative agreement, a species of federal 
assistance agreement identified in the Federal Grant and Cooperative 
Agreement Act, did not qualify as a contract within the coverage of the 
Tucker Act), aff 'd on other grounds, 104 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1997) with 
Thermalon Indus., Ltd. v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 411, 413, 414 (1995) 
(holding that a grant agreement "satisfies the criteria for an express or 
implied contract with the United States and, thus, falls within the scope 
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Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 645 (1974) (noting that 
because "it is impossible to give any categorical definition to 
the word `property' " as used inS 70a(5) of the Bankruptcy 
Act, the predecessor to the current definition of property 
contained in 11 U.S.C. S 541, "[i]n determining the term's 
scope--and its limitations--the purposes of the Bankruptcy 
Act must ultimately govern") (inter nal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). It is well-settled that two overarching 
purposes, one equitable and the other rehabilitative, 
undergird the Bankruptcy Code in general and the 
definition of property contained in S 541 in particular. See, 
e.g., In re Andrews, 80 F.3d 906, 909 (4th Cir. 1996). First, 
the Bankruptcy Code attempts to provide for the efficient 
and equitable distribution of an insolvent debtor's 
remaining assets to its creditors. See, e.g., City of New York 
v. Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 915 (3d Cir. 
1984). Second, the Code seeks to provide debtors with a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
of . . . Tucker Act jurisdiction" so long as it meets the general black 
letter 
requirements for a binding contract, i.e.,"a mutual intent to contract 
including an offer, an acceptance, and consideration passing between the 
parties"). See also Jeffrey C. Walker, Note, Enforcing Grants and 
Cooperative Agreements as Contracts Under the Tucker Act, 26 Pub. 
Cont. L.J. 683 (1997) (analyzing the disagreement between the Court of 
Federal Claim's decisions in Trauma Services and Thermalon, and 
reasoning that federal assistance agreements should constitute 
"contracts" for purposes of the Tucker Act). 
 
The case before us does not directly pr esent a claim by LSS seeking to 
compel HUD to pay over Supportive Housing Pr ogram funds, however, 
and we will therefore refrain fr om resolving such open issues. 
Nonetheless, we believe that DOJ's argument in regard to the scope of 
LSS's right to compel payment is not without for ce. If grant agreements 
do qualify as contracts for Tucker Act purposes, it appears that the 
District Court overemphasized the scope of LSS's right to receive 
Program moneys from HUD insofar as the court characterized it as a 
general right to compel payment from HUD. T o the contrary, under the 
Tucker Act regime advanced by the gover nment, LSS's right is much 
narrower, in that a claim against the federal government for money owed 
would lie only if LSS incurred expenses authorized by the terms of the 
Supportive Housing Program, and HUD refused to disburse federal 
moneys to cover such expenses. While the for egoing analysis does not 
inform our decision, it does inveigh against facile, expansive 
construction of LSS's rights under the Grant Agr eement. 
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"fresh start" by relieving them of the weight of their 
outstanding debts and permitting them to r eorganize their 
affairs. See, e.g., United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 
U.S. 198, 203 (1983); Insurance Co. of North America v. 
Cohn, 54 F.3d 1108, 1113 (3d Cir. 1995). We do not believe 
that inclusion of intangible contractual rightsflowing from 
a HUD-type federal grant arrangement will further either of 
the dual purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. 
 
Under the scheme contemplated by the Bankruptcy 
Code, a debtor's creditors are typically compensated to the 
extent possible and in as equitable a fashion as possible 
pursuant to a court-approved plan, generally after the 
trustee marshals the debtor's bankruptcy property and 
liquidates it at a bankruptcy sale. As a practical matter, in 
order for such a procedure to generate a pool of funds from 
which creditors can be compensated, the items constituting 
the bankrupt's property must be readily alienable and 
assignable--i.e., they must be capable of being sold to a 
third party and of fetching some value as a consequence of 
that sale. Unlike a federal license, which fur nishes clear, 
quantifiable benefits to the licensee, it is difficult to see how 
LSS's tenuous interest in the Supportive Housing Program 
grant relationship with HUD would yield that value, given 
the fact that, as discussed supra in Part II.B.2, any 
potential purchaser would surely have to fall within the list 
of eligible applicants contained in S 11382(1) of the 
Homeless Assistance Act, and would be requir ed to meet 
the criteria set forth in S 11386(b). Mor eover, it is unclear 
why an entity that qualifies as an eligible applicant under 
S 11382(1) would elect to bid on and pur chase the 
opportunity to administer Program funds fr om a previous 
grantee, rather than simply engaging in the or dinary 
grantee selection process. Put another way, even were LSS's 
Trustee to place the right to succeed to LSS's interest in the 
Grant Agreement with HUD up for auction, we ar e dubious, 
as a practical matter, that any potential buyers would 
actually bid for that right. 
 
Inclusion of a grantee's intangible contractual rights as 
part of the bankruptcy estate in furtherance of the 
Bankruptcy Code's rehabilitative goal seems equally 
problematic. It is true that a debtor's "r eorganization effort 
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would have small chance of success . . . if pr operty 
essential to running the business were excluded from the 
estate," Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 203; cf. Stewart v. 
Gurley, 745 F.2d 1194, 1196 (9th Cir . 1984) (per curiam) 
("Unless the debtor can demonstrate that the pr operty is 
necessary to an effective reorganization, the property is of 
no value to him.").8 However , given the pervasive 
supervisory controls over the grant reserved to HUD under 
the terms of the Supportive Housing Pr ogram scheme, see 
supra Part II.B.2., it is difficult to see how LSS's interest in 
the Supportive Housing Program grant could be considered 
essential to the continued operation of its community 
service operations. 
 
The Supportive Housing Program makes available to HUD 
an array of remedial options in the event of a default on the 
part of a grantee, such as the filing of a bankruptcy 
petition. For instance, under the terms of the Grant 
Agreement executed between LSS and HUD, once the 
grantee defaults, HUD can seek to preserve the integrity of 
the Supportive Housing Program grant by or dering the 
recipient to stop incurring costs chargeable to the grant 
program, by reducing the amount of grant moneys 
available, or by substituting another recipient of HUD's 
choosing. In fact, after LSS filed its Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
petition on January 14, 1997, HUD exercised one such 
remedial option by freezing LSS's ability to draw down 
grant moneys. Neither of the parties disputes that HUD's 
actions were authorized by the Supportive Housing 
Program. In light of this freeze on the disbursement of 
funds to LSS, it is difficult to see how LSS's contractual 
interest in the grant relationship would be of any 
assistance to its business reorganization. 
 
In short, we think, as a practical matter, that LSS's 
tenuous interest in the Supportive Housing grant 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In fact, if an item of property in the hands of a third party is 
essential 
to the debtor's continuing business operations, the debtor's trustee, 
provided that the appropriate statutory conditions are met, will typically 
seek to have the property turned over the debtor's estate, see 11 U.S.C. 
SS 542-43, or to have the transfer set aside, see id. S 544. 
Interestingly, 
in the instant case, LSS's Trustee never sought to have WHO's 
assumption of the Supportive Housing Grant voided. 
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arrangement, subject to HUD's pervasive supervisory 
controls, would yield no value even if put up for auction by 
LSS's Trustee. Given the apparent worthlessness of LSS's 
interest, we do not believe that inclusion of that interest 
within S 541's definition of property would serve either the 
Bankruptcy Code's equitable goal of protecting creditors by 
ensuring that they are fairly compensated fr om a tangible 
pool of funds, or the Code's rehabilitative goal of permitting 
the debtor to make a fresh start. 
 
D. 
 
In response to this S 541 property analysis, LSS's Trustee 
counters that even highly regulated items of pr operty, such 
as stock exchange seats and government-issued licenses, 
can constitute "property of the estate" for bankruptcy 
purposes, and argues, therefore, that the fact that federal 
law imposes significant restrictions on grantees such as 
LSS should not preclude the grantee's inter est from falling 
within the Bankruptcy Code's property definition. In 
support of this position, the Trustee points us to such 
decisions as In re Page, 107 F . 89 (3d Cir. 1901), involving 
the bankruptcy status of a member's seat on the 
Philadelphia Stock Exchange, see id. at 89, and In re 
Central Arkansas Broadcasting Company, 68 F.3d 213 (8th 
Cir. 1995) (per curiam), concerning the bankruptcy status 
of a radio station broadcasting license issued by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), see id. at 214. The 
Trustee is certainly correct in contending that the fact of 
significant regulatory control, by itself, will not keep a piece 
of property outside of S 541's expansive scope, and we do 
not mean to suggest that regulation qua regulation directs 
the outcome of the S 541 property inquiry. Rather, we 
conclude only that, under the appropriate set of 
circumstances, the supervisory controls imposed on a grant 
relationship by the substantive provisions of the grant 
program can be sufficiently pervasive, strict, and minute so 
as to make manifest the federal agency's str ong interest in 
overseeing the administration of that grant pr ogram. It is 
that weighty federal interest, and not the bar e fact of 
regulation itself, that can keep the debtor's interest in the 
grant relationship outside of S 541's pr operty definition. 
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Furthermore, the Trustee's r eliance on cases such as 
Page and Central Arkansas Broadcasting is unavailing. In 
Page, a decision that is now a century old, we held that a 
debtor's seat on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange qualified 
as property of the bankruptcy estate under the Bankruptcy 
Act of 1898, notwithstanding the fact that the Stock 
Exchange's constitution required any sale or transfer of the 
seat to be approved by the Exchange. See Page, 107 F. at 
92. We noted that this limitation "possibly affected the 
value of the seat for the purposes of sale, but, while 
restricting, did not destroy its transferability." Id. However, 
our decision in Page has little bearing on our analysis in 
the instant case. Unlike Page, which examined the effect of 
a transfer restriction alone on the bankruptcy status of the 
subject property, our S 541 property analysis takes into 
account the full panoply of supervisory conditions and 
controls imposed by the Supportive Housing Pr ogram 
scheme on the grant relationship between LSS and HUD. 
More importantly, because the case befor e us involves a 
federal agency with a substantial interest in overseeing the 
grant program it is charged with administering, we must 
accord greater weight to that gover nmental interest than we 
ordinarily would provide, as in Page , to a private entity's 
supervisory interest over its relationship with its 
constituent members. 
 
The Trustee's reliance on Central Arkansas Broadcasting, 
in which the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir cuit held 
that a FCC-issued radio operating license fell within the 
ambit of the Bankruptcy Code's property definition, see 68 
F.3d at 214-15, does more to advance his case. After all, 
the fact that the FCC, a federal agency, designates a 
particular radio operator as licensee and retains the power 
to approve the transfer of an issued license does implicate 
a federal concern. Moreover, the Eighth Circuit's decision is 
consistent with a line of cases holding that state-issued 
licenses, commonly liquor licenses, are encompassed within 
S 541's property definition. See, e.g., In re Nejberger, 934 
F.2d 1300, 1300-01 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that a debtor 
licensee's interest in a license issued by the Pennsylvania 
Liquor Control Board constituted pr operty of the debtor's 
estate within the meaning of S 541). Nonetheless, we 
conclude that there are fundamental dif ferences in the 
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nature of a HUD-type grant relationship as compared to 
that of a licensing arrangement that excludes the former 
from S 541's property definition. 
 
First, an entity selected as a licensee plays a dif ferent 
role and faces a different set of incentives than does an 
entity chosen as a HUD-type grantee. Ordinarily, an entity's 
receipt of a license permits the entity to engage in federally 
regulated activities for its own profit. In other words, the 
benefits of the license accrue primarily to the licensee itself. 
In contrast, an entity chosen as a HUD-type grant r ecipient 
is not itself the beneficiary, but acts as an intermediary 
administering those moneys for the benefit of the ultimate 
recipients of the federal assistance. Put another way, unlike 
the licensee, the grantee's position is more akin to that of 
"a trustee, custodian, or other intermediary, who lacks 
beneficial title and is merely an agent for the disbursal of 
funds belonging to another." In r e Joliet-Will County Cmty. 
Action Agency, 847 F.2d 430, 432 (7th Cir . 1988). In this 
latter situation, as compared to a typical licensing 
arrangement, the federal government will likely possess a 
weightier supervisory interest in ensuring that the grantee 
administers the moneys it receives in an ef fective and 
efficient manner so that the ultimate beneficiaries receive 
the full measure of the federal assistance intended for 
them. 
 
Furthermore, as a practical matter , we do not believe that 
a grantee's interest in a HUD-type grant arrangement is as 
easily bought and sold--and thus as readily capable of 
serving as a source of funds from which the debtor's 
creditors can be paid--as is a debtor's inter est in a 
government-issued license. For example, in Central 
Arkansas Broadcasting, the FCC-issued radio license found 
to constitute property of the debtor's estate had been sold 
and transferred as part of a bankruptcy auction conducted 
by the trustee. See 68 F.3d at 214. In fact, courts have 
generally acknowledged that the value of a gover nment- 
issued license can typically be realized thr ough sale, 
notwithstanding conditions requiring gover nment approval 
prior to transfer. See, e.g., Nejber ger, 934 F.2d at 1302 
(noting that "in practice, a liquor license can be bought and 
sold in the market place"); In re T erwilliger's Catering Plus, 
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Inc., 911 F.2d 1168, 1171 (6th Cir . 1990) ("It is undeniable 
that a liquor license has pecuniary value to its holder since 
the license enables the holder to sell alcoholic beverages 
and can be sold for value."). In sharp contrast, our 
discussion supra at Part II.C. demonstrates the 
unlikelihood that a grantee's interest in a HUD-type grant 
relationship would be able to yield any type of value at a 
bankruptcy auction, especially given the strict r estrictions 
imposed by federal law over the identity of any potential 
grantee. 
 
E. 
 
In light of the numerous and varied scenarios under 
which federal agencies enter into contractual arrangements 
with private entities, we must be careful to delineate the 
scope of our holding. As we earlier observed, each time a 
federal agency executes a contractual agreement with a 
private party, a federal interest is ar guably implicated, and 
we certainly do not mean to suggest in our discussion that 
every right arising out of any such contractual arrangement 
should be automatically excluded from S 541's property 
definition. For example, as discussed supra  in Part II.D., a 
licensee's interest in a government-issued license is 
generally likely to fall within the ambit of the Bankruptcy 
Code's property definition, given the fact that licenses, 
unlike grants, typically inure to the dir ect benefit of the 
recipient (as opposed to other, ultimate beneficiaries), and 
are generally capable of being bought and sold in the public 
market. 
 
Moreover, we recognize that agencies of the federal 
government can and do routinely enter into contracts with 
private entities that share the features of ordinary 
commercial agreements. Federal procur ement contracts, 
typically entered into between government agency 
purchasers and private suppliers, are one such example.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In fact, in our prior case law, we appear to have assumed that the 
Bankruptcy Code's definition of "property of the estate" would cover 
federal procurement contracts. For instance, in Matter of West 
Electronics, Inc., 852 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1988), we considered a 
 
                                32 
  
Our holding is not meant to imply that the rights and 
interests yielded to private entities by those contracts 
automatically fall outside the scope of S 541's property 
definition. Although we need not decide today the question 
whether a contractual interest arising out of a federal 
procurement relationship qualifies as property of the 
debtor's estate within the meaning of 11 U.S.C.S 541, we 
observe that, in contrast to a grantor/grantee r elationship 
such as the one entered into between HUD and LSS in this 
case, a garden-variety federal procur ement contract (for 
goods or services) generally does not directly further a 
public-oriented purpose (such as the provision of 
transitional housing to homeless individuals). Thus, federal 
procurement contracts appear significantly less likely to 
implicate a federal concern akin to the weighty federal 
interests operating in the instant case--i.e., HUD's 
supervisory interest in ensuring the efficient administration 
of federal grant moneys by qualified inter mediaries to the 
ultimate beneficiaries of the grant. 
 
The absence of a significant, direct public-oriented 
objective undergirding a procur ement contract relationship 
is evident from the language of the Federal Grant and 
Cooperative Agreement Act of 1977 (FGCAA), curr ently 
codified at 31 U.S.C. SS 6301-08.10 The FGCAA's distinction 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
procurement contract executed between the United States and West 
Electronics, Inc., under which West obligated itself to furnish the Air 
Force with missile launcher power supply units. See id. at 80. After 
suffering financial difficulties, W est filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
relief, triggering an automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. S 362, and the 
United States petitioned the bankruptcy court to lift the stay to allow 
the 
government to terminate the contract. See id. at 80-81. Although we 
reserved a final determination of the issue, we assumed that the 
automatic stay provision--which under S 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code 
extends to "any act to obtain possession of property of the [debtor's] 
estate," 11 U.S.C. S 362(a)(3) (emphasis added)--would cover the 
procurement contract at issue in West. See West Elecs., 852 F.2d at 82. 
 
10. Congress enacted the FGCAA in response to agencies' inconsistent 
and often interchangeable use of assistance instruments such as 
procurement contracts and grant agr eements. One of the FGCAA's 
principal stated goals is to 
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between procurement contracts and grant agreements is, in 
large part, based on the extent to which each contractual 
arrangement directly furthers a public purpose. The statute 
characterizes a procurement contract as"the legal 
instrument reflecting a relationship between the United 
States Government and . . . [an]other r ecipient when . . . 
the principal purpose of the instrument is to acquir e (by 
purchase, lease, or barter) property or services for the direct 
benefit or use of the United States Government." 31 U.S.C. 
S 6303 (emphasis added). In contrast, the FGCAA describes 
a grant agreement as 
 
       the legal instrument reflecting a relationship between 
       the United States Government and . . . [an]other 
       recipient when-- 
 
        (1) the principal purpose of the relationship is to 
       transfer a thing of value to . . . [the] other recipient to 
       carry out a public purpose of support or stimulation 
       authorized by a law of the United States instead of 
       acquiring (by purchase, lease, or barter) pr operty or 
       services for the direct benefit or use of the United 
       States Government; . . . . 
 
Id. S 6304 (emphasis added). As the FGCAA's provisions 
recognize, a private party's interest in a federal 
procurement contract is much less likely to serve a public- 
oriented purpose, such as the provision of federal 
assistance to third-party beneficiaries, and thus the federal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       prescribe criteria for executive agencies in selecting appropriate 
legal 
       instruments to achieve-- 
 
       (A) uniformity in their use by executive age ncies; 
 
       (B) a clear definition of the relationships  they reflect; and 
 
       (C) a better understanding of the responsibil ities of the parties 
to 
       them . . . . 
 
31 U.S.C. S 6301(2). For an overview of the r elationship between the 
various federal assistance instruments, and an examination of the legal 
issues they raise, see generally Jeffrey C. Walker, Note, Enforcing Grants 
and Cooperative Agreements as Contracts Under the Tucker Act, 26 Pub. 
Cont. L.J. 683 (1997). 
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government's interest in the contractual arrangement 
appears substantially less likely to lead to the exclusion of 
LSS's interest from S 541's pr operty definition. 
 
F. 
 
In sum, we do not mean to suggest that every grantee's 
interest in a grant relationship with a federal agency will 
fall outside the scope of S 541's property definition, for we 
must be mindful of the fact that Congress intended the 
Bankruptcy Code's definition of property to sweep broadly. 
But the Code's property definition is not without 
limitations, and under certain concededly narr ow 
circumstances, a federal agency's weighty inter est in 
overseeing the administration of its grant pr ograms can 
suffice to keep a grantee's interest outside of the Code's 
property definition. In this regar d, the touchstone of our 
analysis is the strength of the federal agency's supervisory 
interest over the grant program, best measured by the level 
of agency oversight over the grant relationship preserved in 
the provisions of the federal grant program. 
 
Controls that are sufficiently extensive, i.e., federal 
agency retention of strict, pervasive and minute oversight 
over the identity of the grant recipient and the manner of 
that recipient's performance, can demonstrate the strength 
of an agency's federal interest in the ef fective 
administration of grant moneys, and can lead to the 
exclusion of the grantee's interest in the grant relationship 
from its bankruptcy estate. In the case befor e us, HUD's 
weighty interest, manifested in the extensive supervisory 
controls imposed by HUD through the pr ovisions of the 
Homeless Assistance Act, Supportive Housing Rule, and 
Grant Agreement itself, sufficed to keep LSS's interest in 
the grant relationship outside of S 541's property definition. 
 
III. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
 
Our conclusion that LSS's interest in the Supportive 
Housing Grant relationship with HUD does not constitute 
property of LSS's bankruptcy estate does not fully dispose 
of the merits. There is an issue in this case that was not 
directly considered by either the Bankruptcy or the District 
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Court, and that remains open even in light of our holding 
that LSS's interest falls outside of S 541's property 
definition: whether WHO, by assuming LSS's inter est 
without notifying constituents of the Unsecur ed Creditors 
Committee of which WHO was a member at the time of the 
assumption, breached a fiduciary duty to its fellow 
Committee members. 
 
The Bankruptcy Code authorizes the appointment of a 
committee of creditors, see 11 U.S.C.S 1102, and grants to 
such committees the power to investigate debtors, to 
negotiate a bankruptcy reorganization plan, and to 
"perform such other services as ar e in the interest of those 
represented," 11 U.S.C. S 1103(c). We have construed 
S 1103(c) as implying a fiduciary duty on the part of 
members of a creditor's committee, such as the present 
Unsecured Creditors Committee, towar d their constituent 
members. See In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 246 
(3d Cir. 2000). A committee member violates its fiduciary 
duty by pursuing a course of action that furthers its self- 
interest to the potential detriment of fellow committee 
members. 
 
On May 28, 1997, about four months after LSS's January 
14, 1997 bankruptcy petition, WHO executed a Grant 
Agreement Amendment with HUD, pursuant to which WHO 
assumed LSS's interest in the Supportive Housing Program 
grant relationship. The Grant Agreement Amendment in 
fact identified WHO as "Successor to Life Service Systems, 
Inc." LSS had not identified the original Grant Agreement 
on its Schedule of Assets. At the time it assumed LSS's 
interest, WHO was serving on LSS's Unsecur ed Creditors 
Committee. WHO, however, did not disclose the fact that it 
had assumed LSS's interest in the Supportive Housing 
Program grant relationship to its fellow Committee 
members or to the Bankruptcy Court. 
 
By accepting an invitation to sit on the LSS's Unsecured 
Creditors Committee, WHO clearly incurr ed a fiduciary 
obligation to its fellow Committee members. The question 
remaining before us, therefor e, is whether WHO's actions in 
assuming LSS's interest violated such a duty. The 
Bankruptcy Court summarily concluded that WHO 
"breached the fiduciary duty it owed to general unsecured 
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creditors as a result of its membership on the committee of 
unsecured creditors in that its conduct was blatantly self- 
aggrandizing." The conduct to which the Bankruptcy Court 
referred was WHO's assumption of LSS's interest in the 
Grant Agreement with HUD, without notice to either fellow 
Committee members or to the Bankruptcy Court. The 
District Court never reviewed the Bankruptcy Court's 
fiduciary duty analysis, stating that WHO had not claimed 
"that the bankruptcy court erred in concluding that WHO 
breached its fiduciary duty by assuming the LSS' rights 
under the agreement." 
 
In light of our conclusion above, we are constrained to 
conclude that both the District and Bankruptcy Courts' 
analysis of the breach of fiduciary duty issue was 
incomplete, as neither court considered the important 
question whether a fiduciary obligation to Committee 
members can arise in connection with a transaction 
involving property that falls outside of the debtor's 
bankruptcy estate. This omission is of course explained by 
the fact that both the Bankruptcy and District Courts 
appeared to predicate their breach offiduciary duty 
analyses on the assumption that LSS's interest in the 
Grant Agreement with HUD constituted pr operty of the 
debtor's estate within the meaning of 11 U.S.C.S 541. As 
discussed extensively in Section II, this assumption was 
erroneous. Thus, neither court had occasion to consider 
whether this error would alter its analysis of the fiduciary 
duty issue. 
 
Moreover, in the initial briefing and at oral argument, the 
parties to this appeal never addressed this important 
question, framing the issue before us solely as whether 
LSS's interest in the Supportive Housing Grant Agreement 
constituted property within the meaning ofS 541. Both 
LSS's Trustee and WHO appear to have assumed that the 
Trustee's action for breach of fiduciary duty would not lie 
if LSS's interest fell outside of S 541's property definition. In 
its amicus curiae brief, the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
challenges this assumption. While arguing at length that 
LSS's interest in the grant relationship with HUD does not 
constitute property of its bankruptcy estate, DOJ also 
contends that WHO violated its fiduciary obligation to fellow 
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Committee members by not disclosing the existence of that 
interest. In response, WHO asserts that a breach of a 
fiduciary duty can never occur--in fact, that afiduciary 
duty can never arise--in connection with the transfer of an 
item that is not "property of the estate" within the meaning 
of S 541. 
 
We have problems with both DOJ's and WHO's positions 
in regard to the breach of fiduciary duty issue. DOJ's 
argument that a fiduciary obligation was violated 
notwithstanding the fact that LSS's interest did not 
constitute property of the estate is less than pellucid. 
Under the DOJ's theory, WHO's failure to disclose the 
existence of LSS's interest in the grant r elationship to either 
the Bankruptcy Court or LSS's creditors materially 
undermined the ability of the Bankruptcy Court to take the 
Supportive Housing Program grant into account in 
formulating a comprehensive Chapter 11 plan for LSS's 
reorganization. What the DOJ fails to explain, however, is 
why property that falls outside of S 541's definition, such as 
LSS's interest in the grant relationship with HUD, has any 
role in a debtor's reorganization. 
 
At the same time, we are unwilling at this stage, given 
the scanty briefing and argument on this issue, to adopt 
WHO's suggested bright-line rule, which would have us 
declare that a fiduciary obligation can never arise with 
respect to an item of property not included in S 541's 
definition. Perhaps situations (which we cannot anticipate 
here) could exist in which a creditor's active concealment of 
an item of property that does not qualify as pr operty of the 
estate for bankruptcy purposes would threaten to 
undermine the ability of other creditors to receive an 
equitable distribution of the debtor's remaining assets or 
the efforts of the bankruptcy trustee to r eorganize the 
debtor's affairs. In such a circumstance, imposition of a 
fiduciary obligation may very well further the purposes of 
the Bankruptcy Code and the general fiduciary pr ohibition 
against self-dealing. 
 
In light of the fact that both the Bankruptcy and District 
Courts did not consider these issues, and given the parties' 
failure to fairly present and addr ess these issues to us, we 
decline at this stage of the proceedings to r esolve the 
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question whether WHO breached a fiduciary duty it owed to 
fellow Committee members by failing to disclose the 
existence of an item of property--LSS's inter est in the 
Supportive Housing Grant program--that does not 
constitute property of the debtor's estate within the 
meaning of 11 U.S.C. S 541. Rather, we believe the proper 
course of action lies in remand for further pr oceedings 
designed to resolve this issue in the first instance. On 
remand, the court should consider whether afiduciary 
obligation to fellow unsecured creditors can arise out of a 
transaction involving an item of property that does not 
qualify as property of the estate for Bankruptcy Code 
purposes and, if so, whether, based on the specific facts of 
WHO's case, WHO breached such a fiduciary duty. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 
Court will be reversed, and the case remanded to the 
District Court for a determination as to whether WHO 
breached its fiduciary duty to fellow members of the 
Unsecured Creditors Committee, in light of the fact that 
LSS's interest in the Grant Agreement with HUD does not 
constitute property of LSS's bankruptcy estate. The District 
Court may of course remand the matter to the Bankruptcy 
Court for this determination. Parties to bear their own 
costs. 
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